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ABSTRACT
Marriage penalties are a controversial feature of many government policies. Empirical evidence of
their behavioral effects is quite mixed. This is surprising because economic theory predicts that they
should have an impact on the headship decision. We investigate the removal of marriage penalties
from the surviving spouse pensions of the Canadian public pension system in the 1980s. These
reforms provide a simple and transparent source of identification. Our results indicate that marriage
penalties can have large and persistent effects on marriage decisions. We also present evidence
suggesting that it is individuals with characteristics correlated with greater wealth who respond to
the penalties.
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Introduction 
Subsidies or penalties for certain family structures are a feature of many government 
policies.  These provisions attract spirited debate in both media and policy circles.  Alm et al. 
(1999) argue that marriage penalties are viewed as not only violating principals of equity and 
efficiency, but also undermining the rule of law and family values.  Few features of legislation 
enjoy such widespread notoriety.   
Economists’ primary interest is in the behavioural effects of these penalties.  The reasons 
are standard efficiency concerns, as well as the ideal opportunity the penalties provide to test the 
widely accepted economic model of marriage (Becker 1973, 1974).  This model predicts that 
relative economic opportunities, inside and outside marriage, are an input to the decision to wed.  
Marriage penalties/subsidies generate direct variation in income by an individual’s marital state. 
An additional policy interest is the possible collateral effects of the penalties on health and 
longevity, as well as children’s outcomes.  For example, if marriage penalties promote out of 
wedlock births, or prevent widowed or divorced individuals from re-marrying, children will miss 
any developmental benefits that result from growing up with two, married adults instead of 
growing up with two, cohabiting adults or with a single adult. 
Empirical evidence of the impact of marriage penalties challenges both our theoretical 
intuition and policy interest.  Most studies indicate that the penalties have very modest effects.  A 
number of explanations are offered for this anomaly. The structure of the penalties in, for 
example, the US welfare system makes identification problematic (e.g., Moffitt 1998).  
Alternatively, the variation in the penalties of the US federal tax code across individuals or 
regions or time is not very large (see, for example, Alm et al 1999).  One might speculate that 
these problems mask substantial impacts of marriage penalties but there is little direct evidence   4
that this is true.  In another vein, new theoretical work explains how a strong link between 
marriage penalties and marriage and/or illegitimate births can be consistent with the small 
empirical estimates (e.g., Nechyba 2001). 
In this paper we present direct evidence that marriage penalties can have large and 
persistent effects on marriage decisions.  Our analysis exploits reforms that removed marriage 
penalties from the surviving spouse pensions of the Canadian public pension system in the 
1980s.  Prior to the reforms surviving spouses lost their pensions upon remarriage.  A unique 
feature of the Canadian system is that there are two separate, but mostly identical, pension plans 
that cover individuals in different parts of the country.  The Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) serves 
individuals working in Quebec, while the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) serves workers in other 
parts of the country.  The marriage penalties were removed from the QPP in 1984 and from the 
CPP in 1987.  The structure of the reforms allows us to avoid many of the perceived deficiencies 
of previous studies. More specifically, it offers: 1) simple identification—the temporal structure 
implies that as widows/widowers in one part of the country are affected by a reform, those in 
another part are not, 2) size—the marriage penalty is relatively large so that widows/widowers in 
most age groups experience an unambiguous reduction in financial welfare through remarriage 
before the reforms take place, 3) high treatment—the majority of prime age widows were in 
receipt of a survivor pension before the reforms took place, and 4) breadth—the group of 
individuals affected by the reforms spans a fairly large range of the age distribution, and a 
greater range of the income distribution than samples used in many past studies. 
Trends in marriage rates by previous marital status, presented in figure 1, suggest these 
penalties had some effect.  There is a significant negative trend in the marriage rate of each 
group throughout the period.  There are distinct spikes in the remarriage rates of widows,   5
however, in 1984 and 1987 when the marriage penalties were removed from the QPP and CPP, 
respectively.
1  Furthermore, post 1987 there appears to be a trend break in the remarriage rates of 
widows relative to the rates of the other groups.  
Using data from vital statistics, we confirm this inference documenting large and 
significant jumps in the remarriage rates of widows aged 15-59 and prime age widowers as the 
reforms take place.  The identification of this result is transparent in graphs of the remarriage 
rates of widows and widowers by jurisdiction over the period, and the estimates are robust to a 
variety of checks for spurious inference. The impact of the penalties varies across age groups and 
jurisdictions in expected ways.  Finally, we control for “stock” or “timing” effects that appear as 
spikes in remarriage rates in the years that the reforms took effect. Controlling for these spikes, a 
persistent, substantive effect of the penalties on marriage decisions remains. 
Our estimates contrast with many in the literature.  One explanation is the identification 
strategy we exploit coupled with the large values of the penalty and high levels of treatment.  
Another possibility is that many previous studies focus on the low-income population.  We argue 
that many of the benefits of marriage over alternatives such as cohabitation have value to higher 
income individuals.  This is because the benefits are typically legal rights to assets and income 
when the relationship ends, or to employment benefits associated with high paying jobs.  Using 
data from the 1990 and 1995 General Social Surveys we investigate the characteristics of 
widows/widowers who remarried as the penalties were removed. We present evidence that 
suggests that individuals responding to the reforms possess characteristics associated with higher 
economic status relative to the mean in the pre-reform equilibrium. 
                                                 
1 There is also a spike in the marriage rate of divorcees in 1987.  This is due to the 1986 reforms of Canada’s divorce 
law.  The effect of these reforms is discussed below.   6
While our primary contribution is new evidence that marriage penalties matter, the 
application to survivor pensions commands policy interest in its own right.  Many survivor 
pensions incorporate marriage penalties either explicitly through a prohibition of remarriage, or 
implicitly through an income test applied at the household level.  For example, the survivor 
benefits of the public pension plans of almost all countries of the European Union incorporate a 
full or partial penalty
2, as do the benefits of the US Social Security system
3.  Our results provide 
direct evidence on the potential impact of these penalties on the remarriage decisions of 
beneficiaries. 
Previous Evidence 
The vast majority of previous evidence is studies of the marriage penalties in US federal 
laws, many of which are surveyed in Alm et al. (1999). One source is the penalties in the US 
federal tax code.  The results indicate fairly small effects.
4  For example, Alm and Whittingham 
(1999) estimate the elasticity of the probability of marriage with respect to the marriage penalty 
to be –0.23 for females and can’t reject the hypothesis of no effect for males.  One potential 
problem here is that the tax code is federal which makes identification difficult.  Time series 
variation in the penalty due to changes in the tax law may be correlated with secular trends in 
family structure.  There is also cross-section variation in the penalty—the penalty generally 
larger the greater the similarity of spouses’ incomes—but this may be correlated with 
heterogeneity in couples’ decision-making processes, bargaining positions or preferences for 
marriage.  In addition, as documented by Alm and Whittington (1996a), there are multiple, 
legitimate ways to calculate the penalty and the estimated penalties at the mean are not that large. 
                                                 
2 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/missoc2001/missoc_153_en.htm.  The exception appears to be 
Denmark in cases in which the death occurred after June 30, 1992. 
3 See Brien et al (2000) for example.   7
The other main source of evidence is the literature on welfare and marriage. There are 
numerous papers that explore the relationship between the incidence of marriage or single 
parenthood and the various income maintenance programs in the United States (i.e., AFDC).
5  As 
noted by Moffitt (1998) in his survey of this literature, these studies provide conflicting signals, 
and “better” identification has not necessarily led to more confidence a relationship exists.  
Moffitt (1994) and Hoynes (1997) report that the penalties have little effect in studies that exploit 
time-series cross-section variation in welfare benefits and make proper allowance for state 
specific and individual specific fixed effects.  Dooley et al (2001) make a very similar point 
using Canadian data.  That said, Yelowitz (1998) reports some effect of headship incentives in 
the Medicaid program on marriage exploiting the expansions of the program in the 1980s and 
early 1990s for identification, and Grogger and Bronars (2001) document a relationship between 
welfare and marriage using a twins experiment.   
In addition to concerns about identification, other factors hindering progress in this 
literature include low levels of treatment and a focus on the stocks of individuals in various 
marital states.  For example, the proportion of individuals potentially affected by AFDC rules in 
analysis samples can be fairly low.
6  Also, significant effects on flows out of single parenthood 
may build slowly over time in the stock, and therefore be lost in contemporaneous comparisons 
of changes in the stock to changes in marriage penalties.
7 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Similar conclusions are offered in studies of marriage penalties and the decision to divorce (Whittington and Alm 
1997 and Dickert-Conlin 1999). 
5 Recent research has investigated the marriage incentives of the TANF programs relative to this period (e.g., Bitler 
et al 2002). 
6 Moffitt (1992) reports AFDC participation rates of female heads with children of under 50 percent in the 1980s. 
7 Hoynes (1997) and Bitler et al. (2002) discuss the stock/flow issue in the context of the marriage penalties in the 
welfare system.   8
There is evidence of more substantial impacts of tax provisions on the timing of 
marriage, divorce and births.
8  Alm and Whittington (1996b) find that the size of the potential 
marriage penalty a couple faces has an effect on the decision to postpone marriage to the 
following tax year.  Gelardi (1996) identifies a link between the timing of marriages within the 
year and tax provisions using time-series variation in the laws of Canada and the United 
Kingdom.  Finally, Dickert-Conlin and Chandra (1999) provide evidence that the probability of a 
birth in the last week of the year (versus the first week of the following year) is related to child 
provisions in the US federal tax code.  
One other paper, of interest here, is Brien et al’s (2000) study of the marriage penalties in 
the US Social Security (SS) system.  The authors exploit a change in the law in 1979, which 
removed a partial penalty for remarriage after age 60.  They document a dip in the marriage rate 
of widows at age 59, and spike at age 60, which becomes more pronounced in the post-1979 
period.  This strongly suggests that the SS marriage penalty affects the timing of marriage.   
Survivor’s Benefits in the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans 
The CPP and QPP provide survivor benefits to widows and widowers (henceforth 
“widows”).  To qualify, an individual must be the legal or common law spouse of the deceased.  
Separated legal spouses can also qualify for this benefit.
9  The benefit is payable, regardless of 
the age of the deceased, as long as s/he made contributions to the Plans in one third of the 
calendar years in the contributory period (three year minimum) or 10 calendar years, whichever 
is less.  The contributory period begins at age 18 (or January 1, 1966, whichever is later) and in 
the 1980s ends at age 65 (or death whichever is earlier).  Prior to the reforms outlined below, 
                                                 
8 There is a parallel here to the empirical tax literature.  Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) argue that tax reform leads to 
a hierarchy of responses, ranging from first order effects on the timing of transactions to higher order effects on real 
decisions.   
   9
benefit payment terminates if the surviving spouse remarries.  Benefits are re-instated, however, 
if this subsequent marriage ends in divorce or the new spouse also dies.
10 
The benefits payable are based on the deceased’s retirement pension, calculated at the 
time of death, but vary with the age and family circumstances of the surviving spouse.  The 
formulas in the 1980s, prior to the reforms removing the marriage penalties, are as follows.  If 
the surviving spouse is aged 65 or older, s/he would receive the greater of a) 37.5 percent of the 
deceased’s retirement pension plus 100 percent of her or his own retirement pension, or b) 60 
percent of the deceased’s retirement pension plus 60 percent of her or his own retirement 
pension, with an upper cap equal to the maximum retirement pension payable in that year.  If the 
surviving spouse is younger than 65, and is disabled or has dependent children, the payment is 
37.5 percent of the deceased’s retirement pension plus a flat rate benefit which varies by year, 
and between the CPP and QPP programs.  For surviving spouses younger than age 35, the 
payments only continue while the children are dependent: up to age 18, or age 25 if they are in 
school.  Finally if the surviving spouse is younger than 65 and is not disabled or has no 
dependent children, the same formula is used except that the benefit is reduced by 1/120 for each 
month the surviving spouse is younger than age 45, so that no benefit is payable to individuals 
aged 35 or younger.
11  There are also separate orphan’s benefits for surviving dependent 
children.   
The flat rate component of these benefits in the 1980s, payable to surviving spouses 
under age 65, is presented in table 1.  Note that the rates are generally much higher in the QPP 
than the CPP.  This difference between the CPP and QPP emerged in 1973 when the QPP rate 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Applications for survivors benefits can be rejected if death occurs within one year of marriage. 
10 In this latter case, the surviving spouse can collect survivor’s benefits on the basis of any of her deceased spouses’ 
records. 
11 Note, however, these excluded individuals are eligible for a survivor’s benefits upon reaching age 65.   10
roughly tripled.  Additional disparity between the two programs emerges in 1984 when a new 
higher rate is established for surviving spouses between the ages of 55 and 64 in the QPP. 
More general information about the CPP and QPP is available elsewhere.
12  Suffice it to 
say, it is a contributory public retirement and disability pension plan, financed by both employee 
and employer contributions.  Retirement benefits are payable starting at age 65 at the beginning 
of the 1980s, although by the end of the 1980s benefit receipt can be initiated anytime between 
age 60 and 70 subject to an actuarial adjustment.  While there are many similarities to the US SS 
system, a major point of difference is that the CPP/QPP programs pay out smaller benefits and, 
at least historically, have been financed by smaller payroll taxes.  The maximum benefit in the 
1980s averaged somewhat less than 25 percent of a moving average of the industrial aggregate 
wage.
13 The smaller scale of the CPP/QPP is offset by three other Income Security (IS) programs 
for seniors: the Old Age Security (OAS) pension, the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) and 
the Spouse’s Allowance (SPA).   In the period of study, the OAS is a benefit paid to all 
individuals aged 65 or older and is financed out of general tax revenues.  The GIS is an income 
tested benefit again available at age 65 and financed out of general tax revenues.  Finally, the 
Spouse’s Allowance (SPA) is a program that allows individuals to collect OAS and GIS benefits 
as early as age 60 if they are married to someone aged 65 or older.
14  In 1986, eligibility was 
extended to 60-64 year old widows creating a new, albeit transitory, marriage penalty for this 
group.
15  To provide some context, in 1985 the maximum CPP/QPP benefit was $435.42 per 
month, the OAS pension was $282.94 per month and the maximum GIS available to a singles 
                                                 
12 See for example, Burbidge (1987), Baker and Benjamin (1999) and CCH Canadian Ltd. (2000). 
13 The maximum now tracks exactly 25 percent of a moving average of the industrial aggregate wage. 
14  In this case the entire benefit (OAS plus GIS) is means tested, and at a higher rate. A more complete description 
of this program is contained in Baker (2002). 
15 Any effect of this marriage penalty should be absorbed in the estimating equation by common year effects.   We 
discuss these effects below and in footnote 20.   11
was $338.95 per month.  In the Appendix, we present an overview of Canadian IS programs in 
the 1980s. 
A Comparison to Survivors Benefits in other Countries 
 
The structure of the Canadian survivor benefits incorporates features that are present in 
whole or in part in the survivor benefits of public pension plans in other countries.  For example, 
many plans condition benefit receipt for some widows on the presence of dependent children 
(e.g., Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the US).  In 
the absence of children, benefits in some plans are available only to older widows (e.g., France, 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the US) while others permit some (or all) childless, 
younger widows to benefit (e.g., Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway and 
Spain).  Because we perform the analysis separately by age groups who face these different 
program rules, the results can potentially be informative for program design in these other 
countries. 
The Reforms of the CPP and QPP That Eliminated the Marriage Penalties 
In 1984, a package of reforms was introduced to the QPP that included the introduction 
of flexible retirement provisions permitting retirement benefit initiation anytime between ages 60 
and 70 subject to an actuarial adjustment, as well as the reform of interest here, the elimination 
of re-marriage as a cause for the termination of survivor benefits.
16 In addition, surviving spouses 
who had previously lost their benefits due to remarriage were eligible to have them reinstated 
with the passage of the law.  Reforms of the CPP were made in 1987 that in many dimensions 
mirrored the 1984 reforms of the QPP.  In particular they included the elimination of the 
                                                 
16 This reform also included increasing in the flat-rate portion of disability benefits, providing disability pensions to 
individual aged 60 to 64 who are no longer able to carry on their current employment and raising the flat rate portion 
of the survivor benefit for surviving spouses aged 55 to 64.   12
marriage penalty for surviving spouses, and the reinstatement of benefits for those who had 
remarried previously.
17 18 
The political economy of these reforms is outlined in Baker and Benjamin (1999).  They 
were mentioned periodically in the press and most of the coverage focused on the general level 
of benefits and solvency of the plans.  Likewise, parliamentary discussion of the reforms focused 
on elements other than the elimination of the marriage penalties (e.g., Standing Committee on 
National Health and Welfare 1986). There is no evidence on record that the reforms were 
tailored to some well-known trend in the marriage behaviour of widows. 
There is direct evidence, however, that widowed individuals were aware of the reforms.  
In figure 2 we graph the fiscal year over year growth rate of CPP/QPP survivor pension 
beneficiaries in Quebec and the ROC.  There are spikes in the growth rates in each jurisdiction in 
the years corresponding to the relevant reforms.  These would be due to applications for the 
reinstatement of benefits by individuals who had previously lost their benefits due to remarriage.  
The Predicted Effects of the Removal of the Marriage Penalties 
The elimination of the marriage penalty from the CPP and QPP raises non-labour income 
in the married state.  The single state is unaffected as survivor benefits are available both pre and 
post reform.  Therefore, “full income” in marriage increases both absolutely and relatively, 
which, all else equal, should raise the incentive to marry.   
Some information on the size of the penalty and thereby the potential financial benefit 
from the reforms, is presented in tables 2 and 3.  In table 2 we report the average monthly 
                                                 
17 They also included the introductory of flexible retirement provisions, the increase in the flat-rate portion of the 
disability benefit, changes to the minimum contributory period for disability benefits, an increase in the ceiling for 
combined survivor’s and disability benefits, new rules for orphans benefits and new rules for splitting pension 
credits upon divorce or annulment. 
18 This sequence of reforms has been used previously by Baker and Benjamin (1999) to examine the impact of early 
retirement provisions on retirement behaviour and by Gruber (2000) to examine the effect of disability payments on 
labour supply.   13
survivor pension in payment, by age and sex, in the month preceding the repeal of the marriage 
penalty from the QPP (December 1983) and CPP (December 1986), in year 2001 Canadian 
dollars.  The differences by sex and age make sense given the benefit formulas.  For example, the 
higher benefits for females under age 65 likely reflect the superior earnings histories of their 
(male) deceased spouses, which determine part of the benefit they receive.  The sex difference is 
larger for 65-69 year olds, who also receive smaller benefits on average.  There is no flat rate 
component for this group and so the deceased’s earnings history plays a greater role. Finally, 
there are substantial differences in benefits across jurisdictions for individuals under age 65. One 
source of this disparity is the higher flat rate benefits for these individuals in the QPP (table 1). 
An estimate of the average size of the marriage penalties is presented in table 3.  We 
calculate the present value (2001 CDN dollars) of the average survivor pension taken from table 
2 at selected ages.  This is the amount of benefits widows give up on remarriage. We discount 
future benefit receipt by sex specific survival probabilities (Statistics Canada 1984), and assume 
a real interest rate of 3 percent.  We also assume that benefits remain constant in real terms in the 
future, which is consistent with the indexing provisions of the CPP and QPP.  Finally, for the 
estimates at age 30 we assume the widow has one child, aged 5, who will not remain in school 
past age 18.  Therefore, the survivor benefits are received for the next 13 years.
19 
The estimated costs are not trivial for prime aged females, ranging from $75,000 to 
$130,000.  The sex differences evident in table 2 are preserved here as the base differences in 
monthly benefits are accentuated by sex differences in longevity.  Therefore, females in receipt 
of a pension face a larger penalty and thus disincentive to marry.  The penalty is also clearly 
                                                 
19 The estimates for this age can vary substantially depending on the assumptions made about any dependent 
children.  For example the present value of the penalty is as high as $97,000 for females if we assume the child is 
currently 1 year old and remains in school until age 25.   14
larger for individuals under age 65 in Quebec.  Finally, the penalty is similar across jurisdictions 
and quite small for individuals aged 65 or older.  
We have also calculated a more complex accounting of the full IS cost of remarriage 
prior to the reforms.
20 The “marriage penalty” is defined as the difference between the present 
discounted value of IS benefits flowing to the widow if s/he remains single and the value if s/he 
remarries. The results of this exercise (available on request) are consistent with the story told by 
table 3.  In particular, the magnitudes are very similar reflecting the fact the greater part of the IS 
marriage penalty is the loss of the surviving spouse pension captured in table 3.  The one 
difference is the penalties are larger in the rest of Canada (ROC) reflecting the additional 
marriage penalty imposed by the extension of the SPA to widows mentioned above. 
An estimate of the incidence of the penalties—the proportion of widows or widowers in 
receipt of surviving spouse’s pensions—in the years preceding the two reforms is presented in 
table 4.  These are calculated from administrative data on the number of CPP or QPP survivor 
pensions in payment by age and estimates of the population of widows of that age taken from 
Statistics Canada’s CANSIM database.  Receipt is clearly higher for females than for males and 
would appear to decline with age.  The relationship with age may be cohort effects, however, as 
the CPP/QPP system was initiated in 1966, so the deceased spouses of some of the oldest 
                                                 
20 We take account of the sum of CPP/QPP survivor pensions, CPP/QPP retirement pensions, as well as OAS, GIS 
and SPA benefits received in the married versus single states, accounting for any effects of marital status on the 
benefits received from these programs (through means testing on family income—see the Appendix). The flows are 
defined by the benefits flowing directly to the widow.  We therefore assume there is no sharing in the married state. 
Additional inputs to this calculation include the amount of the retirement pension or non pension income any new 
spouse brings into a marriage, as well as the non-pension income of the widow (note for these calculations we must 
make assumptions about the age and economic circumstances of any new spouse. We also take account of a reform 
of the SPA in 1986 that extended benefits to widows who had not remarried.  This added another marriage penalty 
for widows in the two jurisdictions, although only in a present value sense for those under age 60. Note that this 
second marriage penalty is not necessarily severe for widowed females.  By remarrying they lose access to the 
widow benefits of the SPA starting at age 60.  Assuming that they marry someone older, however, as is typical, they 
will qualify for SPA benefits under its original provisions sometime between age 60 and 64.  For example if their 
new spouse is 3 years older they would qualify for the SPA starting at age 62—a two year difference from the age 
they qualify as a widow.   15
individuals in these years may have had very little participation in the program.  The lower 
receipt rate for males likely reflects the fact that females have lower labor market participation 
rates, and therefore are less likely to have a CPP/QPP earnings history to generate a benefit for 
their surviving spouses.  The rates are also marginally higher in the ROC than in Quebec, but this 
is to be expected since incidence is growing over time and the ROC data are from a later period.  
Data 
The main variable of interest is the remarriage rate of widowed females and males, by 
province, over the period.  The numerator of this rate is constructed from special tabulations 
from the vital statistics marriage file maintained by Statistics Canada.    This file contains the 
information on marriage certificates for all marriages occurring within a given year.  Each 
marriage certificate provides information on the age of the bride, the age of the groom, the 
previous marital status of the bride and the previous marital status of groom, and the year and 
province of marriage. The ages of the bride and groom are reported in five-year intervals, with 
15 age intervals in total. Previous marital statuses are single, divorced and widowed.  Grouping 
these data within Quebec and by province within the ROC, and within the age groups specified 
below, we divide the number of widows or widowers remarrying in a given year by the 
corresponding stock of widows or widowers in these same geographic/age cells, which are 
available through the Statistics Canada CANSIM database. We construct these rates for the 
period 1975 through 1995 inclusive. 
A key advantage of these data is that we can analyze flows into marriage by previous 
marital state.  This is exactly the information we need to examine the impact of the reforms.  
Many previous studies examine the stock of individuals in a given marital state.  The effects of 
marriage penalties may only manifest in the stock over time. A weakness is that there little   16
additional information on the widows.  Therefore we do not know the magnitude of the survivor 
benefits they were entitled to or much about their demographic and economic characteristics. 
An Overview of the Empirical Strategy and Identification 
We estimate changes in the remarriage rates of widowed females and males in Quebec 
(the ROC) as the marriage penalty is removed, using the rates in the ROC (Quebec) as a control.  
The estimating equation is 
(1)  + + ⋅ + + + = t t i t i it REF REF QU REF QU RMR 87 84 84 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β  
   it it t i X REF QU ε η β + + ⋅ 87 5  
where i indexes provinces, t indexes time, QUt is a dummy variable for Quebec, REF84t is a 
dummy variable for the years 1984 and after, REF87t is a dummy variable for the years 1987 and 
after and Xit is a vector of other control variables. The parameters  3 β  and  5 β  capture the relative 
difference in the change in remarriage rates, RMRit, in Quebec and the ROC as the reforms take 
place.  A priori, we expect  3 β  to be positive and  5 β  to be negative if the removal of the marriage 
penalty encouraged remarriage among widows.   
The equation is estimated separately for males and females, and for the age groups <35, 
35-44, 45-59, 60-64 and 65+.  One reason for the age splits is that preferences and/or 
opportunities for marriage may vary systematically with age due to, for example, fertility or 
cohort effects. A second is that the formula for calculating survivor benefits makes distinctions 
by many of these age groupings.   For example, survivor benefits are reduced for childless 
surviving spouses between the ages of 35 and 44.  Finally, changes in other marriage penalties 
over the period directly affect specific age groups. For example, after 1986 the widowed SPA 
has immediate consequences for those aged 60 to 64.   17
The control variables, Xit, are province and year effects and measures of marriage market 
conditions.  The latter are estimates of the ratio of unmarried females to unmarried males in the 
age groupings listed above constructed from Statistics Canada CANSIM database.
21 
Equation (1) is estimated by weighted least squares using the number of widows in the 
corresponding province/age group cell as weights.  Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity.  Estimates of the first through third order autocorrelation parameters of the 
residuals were calculated, and indicate autocorrelation is not a significant problem in this 
instance.
22  Finally, while the linear specification in (1) facilitates comparisons of the estimates 
to graphical evidence of changes in RMRit over the period, it does not obey the restriction 
1 0 ≤ ≤ it RMR .  We have estimated a logistic specification of RMRit by non-linear least-squares 
and both the magnitudes and statistical significance of the estimated parameters are in agreement 
with the results presented below.
23 
 The assumptions for identification in this framework are now well known.  In addition to 
the linear functional form, any time trends must be common to both groups and there can be no 
jurisdiction specific shock coincident with the reform.  Furthermore, in the absence of an 
assumption of a homogeneous treatment effect, we estimate the average effect of the marriage 
penalty on remarriage for individuals whose marriage decision is affected by the remarriage 
provisions of the CPP and QPP.  
                                                 
21 While the age groupings are not necessarily appropriate delineations for marriage market opportunities, the 
estimates of  3 β  and  5 β  are not overly sensitive on this margin. For example, the results are very similar if we only 
include the sex ratio for the age group that the dependent variable (marriage rate) is defined for.   
22 The parameters are estimated by regressions of the current residual on the relevant lagged residual, pooling the 
data across provinces.  The estimates are almost always small (0.2 or less) and statistically insignificant for both 
males and females (largest estimate is –0.32).  Even accounting for the probable bias of estimating these parameters 
from a short panel (Solon 1984), they provide little evidence of substantive autocorrelation.  
23 Where there are disagreements, the estimates from the non-linear model indicate larger effects of the reforms.   18
One change in the marriage market over the sample period is the 1986 reform of the 
divorce act. This reform removed the requirement of fault as grounds for divorce.  Corak (2001) 
presents evidence of a transitory dip and spike in the aggregate divorce rate around 1986, as 
some individuals delayed seeking a divorce until the new law came into place.  A corresponding 
dip and spike in the remarriage rate of divorcees can be seen around this time in figure 1.  To the 
extent that these divorced individuals remarried widows the widowed population becomes 
indirectly treated by the change in the divorce act. 
We perform three checks for these sorts of effects or other jurisdiction specific trends that 
may bias our inference.  First, we examine the time series of remarriage rates in the two 
jurisdictions in the period proceeding our sample period.  Second, we estimate variants of 
equation (1) that include province specific linear or quadratic trends.  Third, we use, alternatively 
the marriage rates of singles and divorcees in the corresponding age groups to form a triple 
difference estimator.
24 
An Overview of the Data 
In table 5 we present an overview of widows and widowers in Quebec and the ROC, 
prior to the reforms, using 1981 Canadian census data.  There are many similarities between 
these groups in the two jurisdictions.   Widows in the ROC are more likely to work, however, 
and their educational attainment is higher, although the latter point may be partly semantic as 
there are fundamental differences in the structure of education in the two jurisdictions. 
                                                 
24 We also investigated the possibility of using the remarriage rates of American widows and widowers as an 
additional control.  Vital statistics on the remarriages of widows and widowers are available for a subset of states 
over our sample period.  To calculate remarriage rates we constructed estimates of the eligible population of widows 
and widowers in these states using CPS data.  Unfortunately these estimates are very noisy, such that the majority of 
the variation of the constructed remarriage rates is attributable to variation in its denominator.  Since our analysis 
depends on identifying “jumps” in remarriage rates, and we have little reason to believe that the population of 
widows or widowers would display such behaviour, this line of inquiry was abandoned.   19
Table 5 also reports the proportions who migrated from Quebec to the ROC, or vice 
versa, over the preceding 5 years.  An implicit assumption of the analysis is that widows in a 
given jurisdiction are not indirectly treated by the reform in the other jurisdiction.  This 
assumption would clearly be false if all widows in Canada are in the same marriage market.  To 
directly test this hypothesis would require the migration rates of the married population by 
(previous) marital status in the origin province, or marriage rates by the previous residence of the 
spouses.  This information is not available.  Therefore, the fact that table 5 reveals very little 
inter-jurisdictional migration by widowed males and females over the past five years is 
supportive of the assumption but not definitive.  More generally, Quebecers are much less likely 
to make cross-provincial moves than English Canadians.  Among widowed females (males) in 
the ROC, 2.4 (2.4) percent reported moving across province in the previous 5 years versus 0.4 
(0.4) percent of those in Quebec.
25  For the entire female (male) population, aged 16+, the rates 
are 6.3 (6.9) percent for those in the ROC and just 1.0 (1.0) for those in Quebec.
26 These 
ROC/Quebec differences likely reflect the underlying differences in language and culture 
between the two parts of the country.   
Our first check for jurisdiction specific trends is presented in figure 3 where we graph the 
remarriage rates of widowed females and males in the two jurisdictions between 1956 and 1975.  
Since annual population by marital status is not available for this period, we use total population 
in the denominator to calculate these rates.   For females, the trends in Quebec and the ROC 
appear identical, the levels differing by a constant.  This is confirmed in regressions of the 
difference in remarriage rates on a constant and up to a quintic in time: the estimates of the 
parameters of the polynomial are consistently small and both individually and jointly statistically 
                                                 
25 Note that inter-jurisdictional and inter-provincial migration are the same for individuals in Quebec. 
26 In the underlying samples Quebecers made up 27 percent of the male and female samples.   20
insignificant.  For males there are some differences in the time series, although primarily in the 
first part of the period.  This is confirmed in the regressions, as the parameters of the polynomial 
are jointly significant using the full sample, but not when we delete the data from the 1950s. 
In figures 4 and 5 we graph remarriage rates, by age, of widowed females and males in 
the two jurisdictions over the sample period.  These are the dependent variables for our 
regressions.  In figure 4 there is evidence of a downward trend in the marriage rates of all 
females over the period.  There is also clear sequential evidence of an effect of the QPP and CPP 
reforms for females aged 15 through 59.  For example, the remarriage rate of females aged 45-59 
jumps up in Quebec in 1984 as the marriage penalty is removed from the QPP.  A corresponding 
jump is visible in the remarriage rate in the ROC in 1987 as the penalty is removed from the 
CPP. In succeeding years the marriage rates in both jurisdictions continue to decline, but from a 
new higher base.  In each case there is also evidence of spikes in the exact years of the reforms.  
These are consistent with either timing effects—some individuals postponing their marriages 
once the reforms were made public—or with stock effects—there was a stock of widows who 
did not marry due to the penalty, who then married as soon as the reform became law. Timing 
effects may be the less likely explanation as benefits were reinstated for all widows who had 
remarried once the rules changed.  The elevated levels of the rates that persist after the spikes, 
however, suggest that the marriage penalties had a longer term effect on marriage activity.   
The evidence for females aged 60+ is not as conclusive.  For females aged 60 to 64 there 
are spikes in the years of the reforms, but less evidence of elevated remarriage rates thereafter.  
The remarriage rates of those 65 and older display little correspondence with the reforms.  
One might be tempted to relate the Quebec/ROC differences in the remarriage rates by 
age group to the information in table 3: remarriage rates are lower in Quebec because the   21
marriage penalties are larger, and the differential declines with age in tandem with the 
differential in the penalty.  While the inter-jurisdictional difference in the marriage penalties may 
contribute to the corresponding difference in marriage rates it cannot be the only cause.  Single 
and divorced Quebecers also have lower marriage rates than their counterparts in the ROC.
27    
Therefore, some part of the ROC/Quebec differential in the remarriage rates for widows in this 
period should be attributable to a common, lower propensity for marriage in Quebec, rather than 
a marriage penalty differential per se.  This is a graphic example of the potential biases in cross 
section evidence of the relationship between marriage penalties and marriage rates. 
The graphs for widowed males aged 45-59, 60-64 and 65+ (figure 5) are similar to the 
graphs for their female counterparts.  There is clear evidence of a persistent effect of the reform 
for those 45-59, some evidence of a transitory effect (i.e., spikes) for those 60-64, and little 
evidence of any effect for those 65+.   
In contrast, the graphs for the youngest males paint a confusing picture.  While there are 
spikes in the expected years, there are also spikes in the Quebec rates in the years between 1986 
and 1989.  Graphs of the numerator of the these remarriage rates reveal dramatic increases (200 
to 300 percent) in the number of widowers remarrying at these ages in these years, followed by 
offsetting dramatic decreases.  One possible source of this activity are the previously mentioned 
reforms of Canada’s divorce laws that led to a transitory surge in the remarriages of divorces 
starting in 1987 (figure 1).   If female divorcees primarily married widowed males, this could 
account for the pattern in remarriage we see in figure 5.  If this were true, however, we would 
expect to see corresponding jumps in remarriage in the ROC as divorce reforms affected all parts 
                                                 
27 For example, the remarriage rate of widowed females, aged 45-59, averaged 0.93 percentage points or 105 percent 
higher in the ROC than in Quebec over the period 1975-1983.  Over the same period, the marriage rate of 45-59 year 
old singles averaged 0.36 percentage points or 54 percent higher in the ROC.  Finally, for divorced females in this 
age group the marriage rate averaged 2.2 percentage points or 72 percent higher!   22
of the country.  Also, examination of the disaggregate data reveals the surge in marriages is 
through unions with single females.  The other possibility is some sort of coding error.  We have 
contacted Statistics Canada about this hypothesis but they report no obvious problem with the 
data.  As we cannot confirm an explanation of these patterns in the data, we report results for 
these age groups but we focus on the estimates for the older males.
28 
Estimates of the Effect of the QPP and CPP Marriage Penalties 
Estimates of equation (1) are reported in the first panel of table 6.  The results for 
widowed females are strongly consistent with the story told in figure 4.  For females under the 
age of 60, there is a clear evidence of a statistically significant and almost symmetric effect of 
the reforms on the remarriage rates in Quebec and the ROC. There is also evidence of a 
statistically significant effect for females aged 60 to 64, although in this case it is almost double 
the size in the ROC.  Finally, there is little evidence of an effect of the reform for females aged 
65+.  In each of these cases the regression results display a remarkable congruency with the 
evidence in figure 4, highlighting the transparency of the identification. 
To provide an indication of the economic significance of the results we normalize the 
estimated increase in the remarriage rates by the average rate in the three years preceding the 
reforms (1981-83 for Quebec and 1984-1986 for the ROC).  The results are reported in the 
square brackets in table 6.  These calculations highlight the lower base remarriage rates in 
Quebec.  For example, the estimated increase of 0.013 for females aged 35-44 in Quebec is from 
a base of 0.013 in 1981-1983.  Therefore, the remarriage rate effectively doubles for this group.  
The jump of 0.009 for females of this age in the ROC is from a higher base of 0.038 in 1984-
1986 implying a much smaller 24 percent increase.  More generally, for females under the age of 
                                                 
28 Another explanation is that these remarriage rates are based on the smallest cell sizes observed, often fewer than 
40 or 50 individuals.  That said, if this were measurement error we would expect a less systematic pattern, which is   23
65 the removal of the marriage penalty increased the remarriage rates between 24 and 100 
percent.   
In the second panel, we present a set of estimates that attempt to net out any timing or 
stock effects of the reforms—the spikes in 1984 and 1987. We add an interaction between the 
Quebec dummy variable and year effects for 1984 and 1987 in (1).  These should absorb any 
extra jump in the rates in these years.  The result for females aged 15-59 is modest decreases in 
the estimated effect of the penalty that preserve the relative magnitudes across jurisdictions. The 
estimates continue to imply sizable increases in remarriage rates ranging from 21 to 108 percent.   
The results for widowed males are presented in the second half of each panel.  Given the 
vagaries of the data for younger widowers from Quebec, we focus on the results for those 45 
years and older.  The patterns of statistical significance of the parameter estimates are very 
similar to the results for females.  Significant effects are found for males aged 45-59.  Widowed 
males have higher remarriage rates than widowed females, so the larger point estimates for this 
group do not imply larger proportional effects.  The proportionate responses to the reforms in the 
first panel are 55 percent in Quebec and 22 percent in the ROC.  Netting out timing or stock 
effects (panel 2) results in very marginal changes.  The estimates for males 60-64 and 65+ are 
small, sometimes wrong signed, often statistically insignificant, and sensitive to specification. 
The final two checks for jurisdiction specific trends are reported in tables A2 through A4 
of the Appendix. Table A2 contains estimates when we add province specific quadratic trends 
(results for linear trends are very similar and available on request).  For widows aged 15-59 and 
widowers aged 45-59 the estimates are very robust to this innovation.  Tables A3 and A4 contain 
the triple difference estimates using singles and divorcees, respectively, as additional controls.  
Most of the results are again very similar to those in table 6 for the age groups of interest.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
exactly what we observe in the remarriage rates of younger males in other provinces.   24
exceptions are the estimates for the youngest females in the ROC, especially when the divorcees 
are used as a control.  Because of the reform of the divorce laws almost corresponds with the 
1987 reform of the CPP, it not clear the much larger estimates for widows aged 15 through 35 in 
Table A4 deserve much weight.
29 
A consistent result for both females and males is that the estimated effect of the penalties 
is larger in the province of Quebec.  An explanation of this result is that marriage penalties are 
much larger for prime aged males and females in this province (tables 1 through 3).  In the top 
panel of figure 6 we plot the responses of widows aged 15-64 and widowers age 45-64 from the 
top panel of table 6 against the estimated marriage penalty for each group from table 3.  We also 
plot the predicted values of a simple linear regression of the responses on the penalties.  The 
relationship between the responses and penalties is positive: the slope of the regression line is 
2.16e-06 with a t-value of 3.60.   
In the second panel of figure 6 we attempt to account for the differences in “treatment” 
across widows and widowers of different ages documented in table 4.  If we assume the reforms 
have no effect on widows and widowers who are not receiving a survivor pension, we can divide 
the estimated behavioral response for each group by the proportion of the group that is receiving 
a pension.
30  The figure in the second panel uses the proportions from 1983 and 1986. The slope 
of the regression line is now 4.91e-06 with a t-value of 2.47, again confirming the inference.  
Context and Interpretation 
Our estimates contrast with many in the literature.  To draw comparisons we focus on 
previous studies that also use a time series-cross section empirical framework.  Moffitt (1998) 
                                                 
29 An explanation of the smaller estimates for these age groups in table A3 is that singles are the most common 
partners of young widows who remarry.   25
identifies three studies examining the relationship between state level welfare benefits and 
marriage or female headship in the US using this approach.  Direct comparison is complicated 
because each of these studies examines the effects of the welfare system’s marriage penalty on 
net changes in the stock of female heads, while the focus here is on gross flows into the married 
state.  Furthermore, the stock of female headship is the result of both a fertility decision of single 
females and a union decision of parents.  That said, in two cases, Moffitt (1994) and Hoynes 
(1997), the authors report no effect of the marriage penalties on the behavior of white females.  
Moffitt (1994) finds some effect for African American females, although the evidence from 
Hoynes (1997) suggests that this may result from his inability to control for individual fixed 
effects.  Lichter et al (1997), however, report statistically significant effects of these marriage 
penalties using county level data from the 1980 and 1990 US censuses.  A $100 increase in 
welfare benefits leads to a 0.838 percentage point increase in the county female headship rate. 
Given the “long changes” (10 years) used to identify the behavioral effect, it seems plausible that 
some part of the estimated response could due to migratory responses to benefit differentials 
(Moffitt 1998).
31  Also, a recent study of the 1970, 1980 and 1990 census data reports no effect 
of welfare benefits on female headship in a model including MSA level fixed effects and time 
trends (Blau et al 2002). 
Grogger and Bronars (2001) study the impact of welfare based marriage penalties on the 
flow into married state, modeled as a hazard.  Their identification strategy exploits variation in 
marriage penalties induced by twin births.  Their sample is unwed mothers who have had one 
                                                                                                                                                             
30  This assumption will be incorrect if treated widows and widowers remarry untreated widowers and widows.  
Across all sample years just under 10 percent of widows/widowers aged 20-29 remarried other widowers/widows.  
This proportion rises to roughly 37 percent for those aged 50-59. 
31 Also, the estimates of the standard errors in this study are potentially biased by “group effects”, as the welfare 
benefit variables are defined at the state level while the dependent variable is defined at the county level.  The 
reported behavioral response has a t-value of 3.92 (Lichter et al 1997, table 3 column 3).   26
birth, and the hazard is defined in terms of duration from this first birth to marriage.  The results 
indicate that a 10 percent decrease in welfare benefits leads to a 5.7 percent increase in the 
percentage of white females married after 1 year and a 3.5 percent increase after 5 years.  The 
estimated responses for African American females are not statistically significant. 
Given differences in samples and dependent variables across these studies, a qualitative 
rather than quantitative comparison of results is probably the most useful.  In the current case the 
reduction in the marriages penalty was 100 percent, so the estimated percentage changes in 
marriage rates in table 6 (square brackets) can be interpreted directly as (discrete) elasticities.  
For prime age female widows these estimates are closer to one than to zero.  Furthermore, if we 
adjust them for the fact that less than 100 percent of widows in any age groups were in receipt of 
a survivor pension (as in figure 6), the estimates for both prime age females and male widows 
would be greater than one.  In contrast, most existing time series-cross section estimates are of a 
zero or at best a fairly inelastic response.
32   
What leads to this difference in results?  One possibility is the identification strategy used 
here combined with the magnitude of the marriage penalties we analyze.  Another is the higher 
level of “treatment”.   In most age groups more than 60 percent of widowed females were in 
receipt of a survivor pension at the time of the reforms.  Although the samples used in previous 
studies differ, the percentage of females potentially affected by AFDC regulations would 
presumably be lower in many instances.  That said, the proportion of widowed males aged 45-49 
in receipt of a survivor pension is only about one-third (table 4), and we find evidence that the 
marriage penalties had a substantive effect on their behavior. 
                                                 
32 We are not aware of any time series-cross section studies of marriage penalties in income tax systems for 
comparison. For example, Alm and Whittington (1999) use panel data, but exploit both the time series and cross 
individual variation in the estimation because they do not include individual level fixed effects.   27
Still another explanation is our focus on the gross flows of individuals into the married 
state, rather than net changes in the stock of individuals who are widows.  Changes in marriage 
penalties will affect gross flows more quickly than stocks, particularly when the absolute levels 
of the flows are small. Small flows and/or a low baseline incidence of the marital state of interest 
can preclude precise identification of stock effects given the sample sizes of popular data sets.  
These considerations are clearly important here.  The age groups with the highest remarriage 
rates have the lowest incidence of widowhood and vice versa.  In table 7 we report estimates of 
equation (1) when the dependent variable is a 0/1 indicator that an individual is widowed.  We 
use the 1976-1995 Labor Force Surveys (LFS), sampling all males or females of all marital 
statuses in the indicated age categories.
33  Given the results in table 6, we expect 3 β  to be 
negative and  5 β  to be positive in these results.  The estimates indicate no systematic effects of 
the marriage penalties on the stock of widows, as almost all the estimated parameters are 
statistically insignificant. The sample sizes for these regressions are between 125,000 and 
1,000,000 observations. 
Finally, our analysis focuses on a different part of the population. Many previous studies 
analyze penalties that affect beneficiaries of income-tested programs.  Marriage penalties in the 
US federal income tax system affect a wider segment of the population, but financially are rather 
modest. 
What might this matter?  Some would argue that the focus in previous studies is ideal.  
Marriage penalties impose a larger proportionate cost on low-income individuals.  That said, the 
benefits of marriage for these same individuals may be very small.  This is because the 
alternative of co-habitation, which offers many of the traditional benefits of marriage such as 
                                                 
33 We use the April and October samples in each year to ensure no repeated observations on individuals.  There is no   28
companionship and economies of scale in household production, is growing in acceptance and 
popularity.  In fact, this alternative is relatively common within the low-income population 
(Moffitt et al 1998). 
Admittedly, co-habitation is an imperfect substitute for marriage.  For example, 
cohabiting relationships are less stable (Bumpass and Lu 2000).
 34  Also, because of the explicit 
contract that it provides, marriage confers a different set of rights and obligations on the parties.  
Cohabiting partners are often denied the rights of spouses in government and private sector 
income support, benefit and retirement programs, although this differential treatment is 
disappearing in many developed economies.  Cohabitants and spouses can also find themselves 
in different positions if the relationship ends either through separation/divorce or the death of a 
partner. 
 There are specific differences in these rights in Canada (see Holland 1990).  For 
example, in most provinces cohabitants do not have occupational rights in the family home and 
all provinces exclude them from intestacy provisions.  During the 1980s cohabitants were not 
equivalent to spouses for the purposes of the Income Tax Act.
35  This meant that cohabitants 
were not eligible for, among other things, the spouse deduction and could not contribute to their 
partner’s Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSP’s, a tax subsidized retirement savings 
plan) as married partners could.
36  Property rights upon dissolution of the relationship have 
different bases in law.  For married individuals the basis is matrimonial property legislation 
under which both spouses are assumed to have contributed equally to the marriage and so the 
                                                                                                                                                             
public use data for the 1975 LFS.  The LFS is similar to the US Current Population Survey. 
34 Recent research on cohabitation includes Moffitt, Reville and Winkler (1998) and Bumpass and Lu (2000) and the 
references therein.   
35 Under revisions made in the 1990s, co-habitants and spouses are now treated the same for this purpose. 
36 The incentive to contribute to the partner’s RRSP is income splitting on retirement to minimize tax payments.  
Canada has an individual based tax system.   29
default is an equal division of family property.  Also, assets are broadly interpreted to include 
family property, business property, pensions rights and even increases in the value of assets 
acquired prior to marriage.  In contrast, property rights for cohabitants are founded on the 
principle of “unjust enrichment”, and so the onus is on the litigant to prove the defendant has 
been unjustly enriched. Furthermore, cases are typically restricted exclusively to family property. 
If these are the primary benefits of marriage relative to cohabitation, it might be expected 
that cohabitation is more common in the low-income population.   These benefits have value in 
relationships where there are income and assets at state.  Accentuating this effect are rules 
limiting partner benefits in government and private benefit plans to married individuals.  These 
rights will have value to individuals in well paying, stable jobs. 
Are these considerations relevant here?  One possibility is the CPP/QPP marriage 
penalties prevented unattached widows from participating in the marriage market.  Once 
removed, these individuals re-entered the market and found mates.  While this explanation may 
played some role in the new long run steady state, if marriage search takes time it is unlikely 
these types of people contributed to the initial response.  More likely it was individuals who had 
identified partners, and were perhaps cohabiting with them, that made up the initial wave of 
remarriages.
37 
We investigate this issue using data from the 1990 and 1995 General Social Surveys 
(GSS).  The GSS is an annual, nationally representative survey of the Canadian population that 
focuses on different social issues.  The 1990 and 1995 surveys contain information to construct 
the marriage histories of respondents extending back three marriages.  This allows us to view the 
                                                 
37 The law only mentions marriage and not cohabitation as a reason for termination of survivor benefits.  That said, 
one might imagine that in practice cohabitation was treated symmetrically to marriage for this purpose.  Discussions 
with individuals at Human Resources Development Canada suggest there was no program of enforcement of such an   30
marriage behavior of widowed individuals over the period the reforms took place.  The number 
of widowed individuals captured in these data is small, however, so our analysis must necessarily 
be exploratory and speculative. 
We select individuals who had a marriage end by the death of their spouse.  We require 
that the deceased spouse could potentially have contributed to the CPP/QPP for at least 5 years to 
ensure that there is a survivor pension at stake. This produces a sample of 2179 individuals, 1723 
of whom are females. Some summary statistics are reported in the top panel of table 8.  Two 
notable characteristics are the rather low level of completed education of the sample and the 
cumulative remarriage rate of 12 percent. 
Most of the characteristics of the individuals captured in the GSS are for the survey date, 
which is January through March 1990 or January through December 1995.  Since we are 
interested in the characteristics of these individuals at the time of any remarriage, we focus on 
attributes that are unlikely to change considerably over time.  We investigate 0/1 indicators of 
educational attainment, and home ownership as a proxy for wealth.  We also examine an 
indicator of whether any remarriage was preceded by cohabitation.  These characteristics are 
used as dependent variables in the equation 
(2)  + ⋅ + + = it it it it REM QU QU Y 84 3 1 0 α α α it it it it X t REM QU ν φ λ α + + + ⋅ 87 5  
where  it Y  is the binary variable for individuals’ education, home ownership or cohabitation, 
84 REM  and  87 REM  are dummy variables that equal one if the individual remarries 
respectively, in 1984 or 1987 (or later), t is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations from 
the 1995 survey, and Xit is a vector of other control variables: quartics in the individual’s age and 
their age when their spouse died, a quartic in the year their spouse died, a quartic in the year of 
                                                                                                                                                             
effective rule during this period.  Furthermore, since cohabitation was not recognized for most purposes under the   31
any remarriage, and dummy variables for females and individuals who remarry.
 38  This equation 
has a similar structure to (1), with  3 α and  5 α  playing analogous roles to  3 β  and  5 β . The main 
difference is that time (and age) effects are modeled as quartics rather than unrestricted dummy 
variables as a concession to the small sample size.
39  All estimation is by weighted least-squares 
using GSS sample weights and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
  The regression results are reported in the lower panels of table 8.  We report estimates 
for both the full sample and the smaller sample of widows.  In the first four rows we examine 
measures of educational attainment.  In either sample the signs of the estimates indicate a relative 
increase in the educational attainment of individuals marrying after the removal of the marriage 
penalty in the QPP, which is subsequently offset as the penalty is removed from the CPP.  Note, 
that the only statistically significant estimates are from the sample of widows.  The signs of the 
estimates for home ownership, as a proxy for wealth, indicate greater resources among those 
marrying post reform.  Finally, the signs of the estimates in the sixth row of each panel indicate 
that the post reform remarriages were more likely to be preceded by cohabitation. 
These results provide some evidence, therefore, that it was more educated and wealthier 
individuals who responded to the removal of the marriage penalties.  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that there are very small incremental benefits of marriage over cohabitation for the 
low-income population.  There is also evidence that cohabitation prior to remarriage was more 
likely after the reforms. That said, the results are based on small samples and many of the point 
estimates are not statistically significant. 
                                                                                                                                                             
income tax act of this time, there were few alternative administrative methods to identify this state. 
38 We have also estimated specifications that include interactions between the remarriage dummy and the quartics in 
age at spouse’s death and the year the spouse died.  These interaction terms are typically jointly insignificant, and 
the effect of this change in specification on the parameters of interest is negligible. 
39 We have replicated the analysis using this alternative specification and retrieved point estimates that are 
qualitatively similar to those reported below.   32
Conclusions 
Marriage penalties are a controversial feature of many government programs. While they 
may be found deficient in a variety of dimensions, the evidence that they cause behavioural 
distortions is quite mixed.  This is surprising because economic theory predicts that these 
penalties provide a clear incentive to remain single (or cohabitate).  In this paper we provide new 
evidence that marriage penalties matter. Previous studies may have been limited by problematic 
identification strategies and/or by applications in which either the penalties are too small to make 
much of a difference or in which marriage is an institution of decreasing attraction for the 
affected population.  We examine the marriage penalties in the surviving spouse pensions of the 
Canadian Income Security system.  These penalties are monetarily substantial.  Also, we focus 
on reforms—that removed the penalties—which provide a simple and transparent basis for 
identification. 
Our primary contribution is evidence that these marriage penalties had large and 
persistent effects on the remarriage rates of widows aged 15-59 and prime age widowers. 
Importantly, the inference is robust to a variety of checks for spurious inference, and varies 
across age groups and jurisdictions in expected ways.  
A secondary contribution, albeit based on small samples, is evidence that suggests the 
behavior of individuals with characteristics correlated with higher wealth was affected by the 
penalties.  This is perhaps surprising because it is low-income individuals who bear the greater 
proportionate cost from marriage penalties.  We argue, however, that the incremental benefits of 
marriage over cohabitation may be very small for these individuals.  This is because many of the 
benefits are found in laws covering the treatment of assets and income.   33
These results potentially have important welfare implications. The largest and most 
robust estimated effects are for widowed females under the age of 60.    Data (1981 Canadian 
census) from a year just prior to the reforms reveals that 56 percent of widows in this age group 
had children at home, so the marriage penalties potentially denied these children any benefits of 
growing up in a household with married adults.  There are also implications for the survivor 
benefits in the public pension plans of other countries that condition receipt for some widows on 
the presence of dependent children.  The incentives for these beneficiaries match up with the pre-
reform incentives faced by Canadian surviving spouses, with dependent children, who were less 
than 35 years old.  We estimate that the remarriage rates of all widowed females under age 35 
increased by between 20 and 40 percent once the marriage penalties were removed.  More 
generally, the results provide a basis for suspicions that marriage penalties in their various 
manifestations affect behavior.   34
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Appendix:   
Table A1: Parameters of Canada’s Income Security Programs in the 1980s 
 
  Eligibility and Funding  Benefits  Means/Earnings Tests 
Old Age 
Security (OAS) 
- Age 65+ 
-Universal subject to 
residency requirement  
- Financed from general 
tax revenues 
 







- Age 65+ 
- OAS pensioner 
- Satisfy means test 
- Financed from general 
tax revenues 
- Set by Parliament 
- Different “Married” 
and “Single” benefits. 




- Yes, based on family 
income 
- Tax rate of 50% (25% 
if spouse is not a IS 
recipient) 







-Spouse is OAS 
pensioner or (starting 
1986) individual is 
widowed  
- Financed from general 
tax revenues 
 
- Set by Parliament 
- Equivalent to sum of 
OAS and relevant GIS 
benefits 
- Not subject to regular 
income taxes 
 
- Yes, based on family 
income 
- Tax rate of 75% until 
OAS component gone 
and then like GIS 






- QPP: Age 65+ (1980-
83), Age 60+ (1984+) 
- CPP: Age 65+ (1980-
86), Age 60+ (1987+) 
- Contribute in at least 
one calendar year of 
“Contributory Period ” 
(starts Jan. 1 1966 or 
age 18 (whichever is 
later) and ends age 70 
or commencement of 
pension (whichever is 
earlier) 





- 25% of “Average 
Pensionable Earnings” 
over Contributory 
Period up to cap 
- Years rearing young 
children (as of 1977 in 
QPP or 1978 in CPP), 
receiving a disability 
pension and 15 percent 
of remaining years can 
be excluded from 
calculation 
(Contributory Period 
cannot be less than 10 
years) 
-Benefits subject to 
actuarial adjustments 
starting 1984 in QPP 
and 1987 in CPP 
 
- None   38
 
Table A2:  Estimates of the Impact of the Marriage Penalties on Remarriage Probabilities 
Net of Province Specific Quadratic Trends 
 
 Widows  Widowers 




















































































Notes: Source: Vital Statistics and CANSIM data. The sample period is 1975-1995.  In addition 
to the reported parameters, the Base Specification includes a full set of province and year effects, 
and the sex ratios of unmarried individuals for the age groups 15-34, 15-44, 45-59, 60-64 and 
65+ (see equation (1)) and province specific quadratic trends.  The “Timing Effects” are 
interactions between the dummy variable for Quebec and the year effects for 1984 and 1987, the 
years the reforms took effect.  All estimation by weighted least-squares using the number of 
widows or widowers in the relevant age group as weights.  Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity.  39
Table A3: Estimates of the Impact of the Marriage Penalties on Remarriage Probabilities 
using the Marriage Rates of Singles as a control for Jurisdiction Specific Trends 
 
 Widows  Widowers 




















































































Notes: Source: Vital Statistics and CANSIM data. The sample period is 1975-1995.  The 
estimates are based on a pooled sample of marriage rates for widows/widowers and singles.  In 
addition to the reported parameters, the Base Specification includes the variables in equation (1) 
plus a widow effect (WID) and widow/year, widow/province and province/year effects. The 
“Timing Effects” are interactions between the dummy variable for Quebec and the year effects 
for 1984 and 1987, the years the reforms took effect.  All estimation by weighted least-squares 
using the number of widows/widowers or singles in the relevant age group as weights.  Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  40
Table A4: Estimates of the Impact of the Marriage Penalties on Remarriage Probabilities 
using the Marriage Rates of Divorcees as a control for Jurisdiction Specific Trends 
 
 Widows  Widowers 




















































































Notes: Source: Vital Statistics and CANSIM data. The sample period is 1975-1995.  The 
estimates are based on a pooled sample of marriage rates for widows/widowers and divorcees. In 
addition to the reported parameters, the Base Specification includes the variables in equation (1) 
plus a widow effect (WID) and widow/year, widow/province and province/year effects.  The 
“Timing Effects” are interactions between the dummy variable for Quebec and the year effects 
for 1984 and 1987, the years the reforms took effect.  All estimation by weighted least-squares 
using the number of widows/widowers or divorcees in the relevant age group as weights.  
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  41
Table 1: Monthly Flat Rate Component of Survivor Benefits by Year 
 
 QPP  CPP 
1980 146.78    57.25 
1981 161.31    62.91 
1982 181.18    70.68 
1983 201.44    78.60 
  Aged <55  Aged 55-64   
1984 214.94  275.00  83.87 
1985 224.40  287.10  87.56 
1986 233.38  298.58  91.06 
1987 242.95  310.82  94.79 
1988 253.64  324.50  98.96 
1989  264.04 337.80 103.02 
1990  276.71 354.01 107.96 
 
Notes: All amounts are in current Canadian dollars.  Surviving spouses under age 65 receive the 
flat rate component plus 37 ½ percent of the deceased spouse’s retirement pension.  The benefits 
for surviving spouses over the age of 64 are described in the text. 
 
 
Table 2: Average Monthly Benefit of Survivor Pension in Payment in the Month of 
December Preceding the Removal of the Marriage Penalty 
 
  QPP (December 1983)  CPP (December 1986) 
Age  Males Females Males Females 
<35  445.18 484.12 254.83 301.47 
35-44  411.24 466.88 219.43 285.63 
45-59  436.45 498.91 248.40 314.94 
60-64  447.64 497.78 237.61 309.77 
65-69  74.02 219.64 63.62 214.25 
 
Notes: All amounts are in year 2001 Canadian dollars.  Source Regie des rentes du Quebec 
(1985) and Canada Pension Plan (1987).  42
Table 3: The Simple Present Value of the Average Monthly Benefit of Survivor Pensions in 
Payment in the Month of December Preceding the Removal of the Marriage Penalty 
 
 QPP  CPP 
Age  Males Females Males Females 
30  54527 61821 31231 36947 
40  115629 131235  61713  80359 
50  105710 120839  60197  76322 
60  87949 97802 46710 60896 
65  12689 37649 10912 36748 
 
Notes: All amounts are in year 2001 Canadian dollars.  Average monthly benefits are taken from 
table 2.  Individuals under age 45 are assumed to have children so there is no reduction in 
benefits.  Individuals aged 30 are assumed to have one child aged 5 who finishes school at age 
18, so benefits are received for 13 years. 
 
 
 Table 4: Proportion of Widows Receiving QPP or CPP Survivor Benefits 
 
 Females  Males 
Age  <35  35-44 45-59 60-64  65+  <35  35-44 45-59 60-64  65+ 
Quebec in Years Preceding the 1984 Reform 
1981  0.71 0.79 0.68 0.58 0.27 0.24 0.37 0.19 0.13 0.05 
1982  0.71 0.87 0.71 0.61 0.31 0.23 0.45 0.22 0.14 0.06 
1983  0.71 0.89 0.74 0.64 0.35 0.23 0.52 0.24 0.16 0.07 
The ROC in Years Preceding the 1987 Reform 
1984  0.67 0.89 0.83 0.65 0.33 0.17 0.40 0.36 0.26 0.12 
1985  0.67 0.90 0.85 0.66 0.37 0.16 0.40 0.36 0.27 0.14 
1986  0.66 0.92 0.87 0.68 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.38 0.30 0.16 
 
Notes:  Source Statistics Canada’s CANSIM database, Source Regie des rentes du Quebec 
(1985) and Canada Pension Plan (1987).  43
 Table 5: Some Characteristics of Widows and Widowers from the 1981 Canadian Census 
 
 Widows  Widowers 
  Quebec ROC Quebec ROC 
All Ages (16+) 
Age  67.6 68.8 69.3 70.9 
Employed  0.13 0.17 0.26 0.26 
High  School  Graduate  0.10 0.06 0.07 0.04 
University  Graduate  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 
Wages if employed  8975  8432  12673  13439 
Total Income (all individuals)  6573  7557  8933  10574 
Cross Jurisdictional Mover in Past 
5 years 
0.004 0.006 0.004 0.005 
Sample  Size  4794 14464 1006  3023 
Ages 16-59 
Age  50.9 50.7 51.0 50.4 
Employed  0.38 0.55 0.73 0.77 
High  School  Graduate  0.13 0.10 0.12 0.05 
University  Graduate  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.07 
Wages if employed  9623  9396  14336  16816 
Total Income (all individuals)  8538  10477  14093  17926 
Cross Jurisdictional Mover in Past 
5 years 
0.008 0.006 0.005 0.006 
Sample Size  1122  2630  214  535 
 
Notes: Source 1981 Canadian Census. 
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Table 6: Estimates of the Impact of the Marriage Penalties on Remarriage Probabilities 
 
 Widows  Widowers 




























































































































Notes: Source: Vital Statistics and CANSIM data.  The sample period is 1975-1995.  In addition 
to the reported parameters, the Base Specification includes a full set of province and year effects, 
and the sex ratios of unmarried individuals for the age groups 15-34, 15-44, 45-59, 60-64 and 
65+ (see equation (1)).  The “Timing Effects” are interactions between the dummy variable for 
Quebec and the year effects for 1984 and 1987, the years the reforms took effect.  All estimation 
by weighted least-squares using the number of widows or widowers in the relevant age group as 
weights.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.   45
Table 7: Estimates of the Impact of the Marriage Penalties on the Stock of Widows 
 
 Widows  Widowers 











































Notes: Source: Labor Force Survey and CANSIM data. The sample period is 1975-1995.  In 
addition to the reported parameters, the estimating equation includes a full set of province and 
year effects, and the sex ratios of unmarried individuals for the age groups 15-34, 15-44, 45-59, 
60-64 and 65+ (see equation (1)).  All estimation by weighted least-squares using LFS sample 
weights.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.   46
Table 8: Evidence of the Widows and Widowers Who Responded to the Removal of the 
Marriage Penalties drawn from the 1990 and 1995 General Social Surveys 
 
Sample Characteristics 
Sample Size  2179 
Age at Death of Spouse  59 
Elementary Education  0.37 
University Graduate  0.13 
Resident in Quebec  0.25 
Remarried in Sample Period   0.12 
1995 survey  0.55 
Regression Results for Full Sample 
 QU*REF84  QU*REF87 




























Regression Results for Females 





























Notes: Source 1990 and 1995 General Social Survey.  In addition to the reported parameters, the 
regression equation includes quartics in age, age at spouse’s death, the year the spouse died and 
the year of any remarriage, and dummy variables for Quebec, remarriage and females (where 
appropriate).  All estimation by weighted least-squares using GSS sample weights.  Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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Figure 1: Marriage rates by Marital Status in Canada, 1974-1994 
 
Notes:  Source Nault (1996).  The rates for the widowed population have been multiplied by 10 
to produce a common scale. 
 




































































































































Rest of Canada  48
 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: The Relationship Between the Estimated Behavioral Response and the Size of the 




Notes: In panel A the present values of marriage penalties and estimated behavioral responses 
are from tables 3 and 6 respectively.  In the panel B the estimated behavioral responses have 
been divided by the proportion of widow(er)s in an age group receiving a survivor pension from 
table 4, to account for differences in treatment across age groups. The solid lines graph the 
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